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This paper investigates the causal effect of changes in health on economic development 
using a long panel of European countries. Identification is based on the particular timing of 
the introduction of public health care systems in different countries, which is the random 
outcome of a political process. We document that the introduction of public health care 
systems had a significant immediate effect on the dynamics of infant mortality and crude 
death rates. The findings suggest that a reduction in infant mortality or crude death rates 
exhibited a positive effect on growth in income per capita and increased population growth. 
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The causal eect of general health conditions on economic performance is in-
tensely debated in the literature. Arguably, health, reected by mortality of
infants and adults, aects economic performance through human capital invest-
ments, physical capital accumulation, population growth, productivity and female
labor force participation. The main challenge for the identication of the total
eect is the problem of reverse causality, since mortality is likely to be aected
by economic development, for example, because rich countries can aord better
health systems.
The existing literature has used two dierent instrumental variable strate-
gies to circumvent the reverse causality problem and identify the causal eect of
longevity on economic growth. Most of the literature, including recent work by
Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008) has used exogenous variation across
countries, such as climatic factors, geographical features, or disease indices, as
instruments for dierences in life expectancy across countries, and has found
positive eects of longevity on growth. Recent research, starting with the contri-
bution of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) has exploited within-country variation by
applying time varying instruments to identify the causal eect of life expectancy
on economic growth, and has found mixed or even negative eects.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to this literature by estimating the causal
eect of mortality growth on economic growth using a novel identication strategy
that exploits within country variation in a long-panel of 12 European countries
over the period 1820 to 2010. In particular, we apply an instrumental variable ap-
proach that exploits variation in the introduction dates of universal public health
care. Universal public health care systems in terms of the introduction of a public
health insurance or the public payment of subsidies for health services imply (po-
tential) coverage of the entire population. In the sample, we adopt a rather broad
concept of universal public health care systems reected by the introduction of
access to health care for all people in need for health care, independent of their
individual income. The novel feature of the identication strategy is its reliance
on the particular timing of the implementation in each country, rather than on
2the implementation per se. While the implementation of public health care might
be related to the level of economic development, the particular year in which the
implementation takes place is largely random, since the implementation is typi-
cally the outcome of a lengthy political process with substantial uncertainty. In
light of this fact, we apply a timing of events methodology, in which identication
is driven by within country variation in mortality around the period of implemen-
tation, which can be used to identify causal eects on economic development in
that time period.
The empirical results indicate that the introduction of public health systems
signicantly reduced infant mortality and crude death rates, which are proxies for
an improvement in overall health conditions. The second stage estimates provide
evidence for a signicant positive eect of overall health conditions on economic
growth as well as on population growth.
These ndings complement and qualify the existing estimates in the literature
in several dimensions. Using cross country data from the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), the United Nations (UN) Population Division and the World
Bank, the empirical literature typically nds that an increase in adult mortality
substantially reduces GDP per capita growth. Lorentzen et al. (2008) for exam-
ple, nd that an increase in adult mortality of one standard deviation reduces
growth by 1.1 percentage points, mainly through the physical capital and fertil-
ity channel. This line of research cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity
across countries or exploit health dynamics, since the instruments are constant
over time, however. Noting this, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) use panel data
for 47 countries from the League of Nations, the WHO and the UN, and exploit
the drop in mortality from specic infectious diseases due to the international
epidemiological transition as instrument for the change in life expectancy. This
identication makes use of the fact that the mortality rate from these diseases
was exogenous in 1940, because no treatments, medication or vaccines were avail-
able before that time. By 1980, on the other hand, all these diseases could be
treated or prevented in all countries due to medical advances and international
organizations such as the WHO. The ndings suggest a positive but insignicant
3eect of life expectancy on aggregate GDP, and a positive signicant eect on
population growth. The total eect on GDP per capita is negative.
This nding led to controversial discussions about the identifying assumptions
that drive the results. Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2009) argue that mortality
from the specic diseases in the instrument by Acemoglu and Johnson was not
exogenous in 1940 as countries like the United States had reduced their disease
burden, e.g., from malaria, before 1940, and given the evidence that mortality
from infectious diseases in the United States had peaked around 1900 as shown
by Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006). Acemoglu and Johnson (2009)
clarify their identifying assumptions, leaving open whether the dierent results
in the literature are driven by the dierent identication assumptions, or by the
dierent sample compositions in terms of countries and observation period, as
suggested by Angeles (2010) and Cervellati and Sunde (2011).
The ndings presented in this paper indicate that the positive eect of life
expectancy on growth found in cross-country studies is not necessarily due to
the use of time-invariant instruments. Second, the ndings support the evidence
of Cervellati and Sunde (2011) that the dierent results in the literature might
be driven by dierences in sample composition. Third, the ndings suggest that
improving health conditions might have a substantial eect on economic perfor-
mance, and that public health policy and the institutional environment might
play an important role for economic development.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and
discusses the identication strategy and describes the data. The main results are
presented in Section 3, and results from additional robustness checks are discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Identication and Data
2.1 Identication Strategy
The identication strategy uses the exact date of implementation of a universal
public health system as exogenous variation. In particular, the identication
4exploits the eect of the implementation of a public health system on within-
country variation in health, to identify the eect of variation in health conditions
on economic growth. Of course, the implementation and existence of a universal
public health care system is inuenced by the initial economic situation. Poor
countries might not be able to aord the costs of a public health system, while rich
countries can aord them. However, we argue that the timing of the introduction
is exogenous and driven by many complex political processes that are unrelated
to current economic performance. Due to the small sample size, it is possible to
identify the driving political forces behind the implementation of a public health
system and to investigate the plausibility of the identication assumption of the
exogeneity of the implementation date in detail.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use a broad concept of universal public
health systems. According to Mackenbach (1996), the introduction of universal
public health systems improves life expectancy especially for children and less
endowed individuals who, in contrast to rich individuals, cannot aord the con-
tributions to a private insurer. Upon their introduction, many universal public
health systems indeed only cover a small fraction of the population, often just
children and very needy people. This implies that the introduction of a pub-
lic health system can be expected to aect overall health in dierent ways. To
capture this, we use infant mortality as well as the crude death rate as dierent
proxy measures of longevity and health.
A rst indication of exogeneity of the implementation date is the randomness
of the implementation process. For example, in the Netherlands several attempts
to introduce a universal public health care system failed. Finally, the rst univer-
sal public health insurance system was introduced under the German occupation
in 1941. Other countries which where also under German occupation did not in-
troduce a universal public health care system during World War II. In Spain, the
Franco Regime introduced the rst universal public health care system in 1942.
Earlier attempts to introduce a public health care system failed, because there
was no majority in parliament. We therefore think that the implementation dates
are driven by events which have a high degree of uncertainty and are dicult to
5predict. In particular, we think that there are good reasons to assume that the
implementation dates are exogenously determined and not driven by economic
growth.1
A second indication for the validity of this identication strategy is evidence
suggesting that the introduction of a universal public health care system took
many years and that the timing was heavily inuenced by the political regime.
In an autocratic regime, like in Italy at the time when the health system was
implemented, the government could decide about a public system by itself. In
a democracy, a majority in the parliament or in a referendum is required. This
takes typically much longer. For example, in Switzerland the rst referendum
was rejected in 1899. Only 12 years later the health insurance law was nally
passed by another referendum. Evidence strongly suggests that the introduction
dates depend on the type of government. Lindert (2004) distinguishes between
elite democracies and full democracies.2 He argues that elite-democracies are
less willing to set up government nanced social programs, in comparison to full
democracies. In monarchies like Austria, social insurance systems were introduced
relatively early in order to reduce the power of the socialists.
A third factor is the type of health care provider in place before the intro-
duction of a universal public health system. Private insurers typically oppose
a public insurance scheme. Especially in the Netherlands, they prevented the
introduction of an early public health system for a long time. In other countries
like Denmark or Finland, corporate groups or municipalities were responsible for
early health care. They typically supported the introduction of a universal public
health system, speeding up the implementation in an international comparison.
Another important factor is the type of public insurance which is introduced.
We do not distinguish the introduction of a health system that covers the en-
tire population from the beginning, from the introduction of subsidies for health
services only for a specic subpopulation of needy people. When an adequate in-
surance scheme is already in place before public health care, the government can
1A historical review of public health insurance for all relevant countries can be found in the
appendix.
2Elite democracies are political systems with property requirements for franchise, which excluded
large parts of the population from the voting process.
6simply pay subsidies to these institutions, as was the case in Belgium and Den-
mark. The payment of subsidies typically covers only very needy people and is
therefore less expensive. Laws for such systems can pass the parliament more eas-
ily than a more comprehensive health law like in the UK, where the public health
insurance scheme covers the entire population, from the rst day of introduction.
Not distinguishing among the dierent types of public health care systems might
constitute a problem because it potentially weakens the link to health outcomes.
On the other hand, the consideration of dierent types of public health care
implies a large degree of randomness in the timing of the implementation.
Thus, the introduction dates of a universal public health care system are
inuenced by factors that can either be controlled for, or which are (mean) in-
dependent of the economic situation, so that the dates of implementation can
be assumed to be plausibly exogenous for the purpose of this paper. (Note that
this does not imply that the fact that a public health care system is eventually
implemented is independent of the economic situation.) The exclusion restriction
(that the implementation of a public health system aects economic growth in
the intermediate aftermath of the implementation only through eects on public
health conditions) appears plausible, in particular in light of the fact that we con-
sider growth rates rather than levels in our outcome specications. If anything,
the identifying assumption is conservative, since less developed countries can also
have high income or population growth rates (e.g., during a convergence process
or the demographic transition). It is therefore unlikely, that the growth rate has
an inuence on the introduction date of a public health care system, especially
when one takes into account the fact that such an introduction takes many years.
Moreover, since under- and less-developed countries might simply not be able to
aord the costs of a public health care system, we consider in our sample only
relatively developed countries (see Table 23 in the Appendix). We argue that
during the entire observation period, each of the countries in our sample could in
principle aord the costs of a public health system.
72.2 Data
We use data for 12 Western European countries over the period 1820 until 2010.
The data on GDP per capita, population size and GDP are collected from Mad-
dison (2006). This data is available on a yearly basis and goes back to 1820.
The infant mortality rate and the crude death rate are taken from Flora, Kraus,
and Pfenning (1987). They provide data for 13 Western European countries from
1815 until 1975.3 We do not consider Ireland and Germany, because of too many
missing observations and major territorial changes.4 Additional data for Spain
is collected from Mitchell (1992). In case of missing observations we use data
from Mitchell (1992) until 1988 and after that we use the mortality rates from
the OECD Health Data (updated June 20, 2010). The infant mortality rate is
dened as deaths under the age of one per 1,000 live births, i.e., stillbirths are
excluded. The crude death rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 persons. The
dates for the introduction of a public health system in the 12 countries are re-
ported in Table 23. Detailed information about the history of universal public
health care systems can be found, for each country separately, in the appendix.
As additional controls, we use variables which approximate the political institu-
tions in terms of democratization of a country, reected by a dummy that takes
value 1 after the rst observation of election rules in a specic country, as well as
a variable that reects the age of these rules. Dates for the rst year of election
are collected from Persson and Tabellini (2003). Additionally, we use the politi-
cal regime characteristics and transitions (1800-2009) from the Polity IV project.
From this index we create indicators for autocracies, anocracies and democracies,
as suggested by Gurr (1974). In order to account for the structural change we
condition on the share of agriculture, industry (manufacturing) and services as
fraction of total GDP from Flora (1983).5 Moreover, we collect the government
expenditure as share of total GDP, the number of labor disputes (per million
workers), the number of workers involved in labor disputes (per million workers),
3For the UK we use own calculations of the mortality rates as weighted average of the mortality
rates from England, Wales, Scotland and North Ireland.
4However, the main results do not change when we include these countries.
5Missing observations are from Mitchell (1992) and from OECD Annual National Accounts
(Volume 2).
8number of days lost in labor disputes (per million workers), and gross capital for-
mation as share of total GDP from Mitchell (1992). Missing data for government
expenditure and gross capital formation is completed with data from the OECD
Annual National Accounts (Volume 2) and additional data about labor disputes
is collected from the ILO Department of Statistics.
Using this information, we create an unbalanced data set with a 20-yearly
frequency from 1850 until 2008 as described in the next section.6 In the baseline
specication we have 84 observations. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table
3. We use discrete growth rates in our estimation, because the mortality growth
rates are typically negative.7 The infant mortality growth is between -75% and
37%. On average the growth rate is -36%. The growth in the crude death rate
exhibits less variation. It is on average -11% and lies between -50% and 33%.
GDP per capita growth is on average 49% over a 20-year period, which implies
an annual growth rate of about 2%.8 The population growth is on average 14%
and the average aggregate GDP growth amounts to 70% during 20 years.
2.3 Estimation Strategy
In order to exploit the exact introduction dates, we construct the panel data as
follows. In addition to calendar time  we create a synthetic time variable t, which
is normalized to be equal to zero in the 20-year period after the introduction of a
universal public health care system. We then calculate the growth rates for each
country and 20-year time period on the basis of the synthetic time frame. Figure
1 illustrates that the exact years for which the growth rates are calculated are
6In earlier specications we also used a balanced data set for which the number of observations
is much smaller. The main results are identical.





where i denotes the country and t the time dimension. The results for log-dierences are
qualitatively equal and quantitatively larger, but the calculation in log-growth rates would
potentially overestimate the true values as it delivers negative growth rates exceeding -100%.
The results also do not change when we use average yearly growth rates.
8There are some observations of very high growth rates, in particular for Austria, which exhibits
growth of up to 283% during one 20-year window (almost 7% per year). In robustness checks
we excluded Austria. The results remain robust and qualitatively unchanged.
9dierent for each country. For example, in Switzerland, where the public health
system was implemented in 1911, we compute the growth rates from 1891 to
1911, from 1911 to 1931, and so on. In the Netherlands, where the public health
system was implemented in 1941, we calculate the growth rates from 1921 to 1941
and from 1941 to 1961 and so on. Accordingly, the introduction dates correspond
to time t =  1 (minus 20 years) of this synthetic time index. As consequence,
for each country the exact years over which the growth rates are computed are
dierent. This procedure has two advantages. First, this approach calculates
the exact growth rates directly after the introduction of the public system on a
yearly basis. Second, it helps to disentangle common time factors, since we do
not calculate the growth rates for exactly the same years, even though there is
some overlap. In the next step we construct an instrument for the introduction
of a universal public health care system, which is equal to 1 at time t = 0 of
the synthetic time frame, and 0 otherwise (see Figure 2). This means that the
instrument is only equal to 1 immediately after the introduction of the public
health care system. This is a precise way to identify the timing of the introduction,
and hence its eect on health. This construction is conservative, as long run eects
are not captured by this strategy. Likewise, this identication strategy avoids that
the results take up long run time trends or shocks, which are unrelated to the
introduction of public health insurance. Overall, exploiting a one-o variation
in public health systems and constructing the data around the implementation
date suggests that the exclusion restriction that the implementation of a health
system aects growth only through improvements in health (conditional on other
control variables) is plausibly satised.
We are interested in estimating the causal eect of changes in mortality, mea-
sured by infant mortality or crude death rates, on GDP per capita growth, pop-
ulation growth and aggregate GDP growth, respectively. While all variables are
observed in calendar time , they are coded in terms of the synthetic time index t.
Consequently, all variables are indexed by the subscript i indicating the country,
subscript  indicating the year of observation, and t indicating the 20-year period
in terms of the synthetic time index. Since the empirical analysis is conducted on
10the basis of a 20-year frequency,  and t essentially contain the same information,
such that we can limit the notation to the synthetic time index t. The respective
outcome variables (GDP per capita growth, population growth, and aggregate
GDP growth) are denoted by yi;t for i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T. The variable
mi;t corresponds to the change in mortality, either in terms if the infant mor-
tality or the crude death rate. Additional lagged control variables are denoted
by the vectors x1;i;t 1 and x2;i;t 1. Let si;t be a selection indicator, where si;t = 1
if fyi;t;mi;t;x1;i;t 1;x2;i;t 1g are jointly observed in a particular country and
observation period, and zero otherwise.9 Then y and m are two 1  S vec-





X1 and X2 are two kj  S matrices (with j 2 1;2), involving kj lagged control
variables, including deterministic time patterns and country specic intercepts.10
The regression model is specied as
y = b m + b 
0
1X1 + b 
0
2X2 + b u;
where the residual vector b u has an expected value E[b u] = 0. The parameter b j
is a kj  1 vector (with j 2 1;2) and the coecient b  is a scalar. The estimated
parameter of interest is b , which has no causal interpretation in this simple setting
in light of the potential problem of reverse causality.
In order to identify causal eects, we use the introduction of a universal public
health care system (zi;t  Insi;t 1) as instrument for infant mortality growth
and crude death growth as illustrated in Figure 2. The identication of causal ef-
fects is based on assumptions about the instrument, which hold jointly conditional
on the control variables X1 and X2. First, we assume that the outcome y has
no systematic inuence on the instrument z. Second, the instrument has only an
indirect eect on the outcome variables, i.e., the introduction of universal health
services improves the health status m and via this channel the expected out-
9Only periods which are observed in the unbalanced panel are considered in the following.
10Deterministic time patterns, such as trends or period dummies, are coded in synthetic time t
but exploit variation in calendar time . For example, period dummies are coded as 1 if the
respective period t falls in the corresponding decade of calendar time, and zero otherwise. Like-
wise, period trends are coded according to the respective calendar time period that corresponds
to the particular t of a given country-year observation.
11come, alternative channels do not exist. These two assumptions are not testable,
and we can only use economic arguments and plausibility tests to justify that
they are satised. The third assumption, which states that the instrument has
sucient power to inuence the endogenous variable, can be tested. In light of
modest unconditional eects of the introduction of an universal public health
care system on mortality growth (see Figure 3), this instrument could potentially
have little power. In order to avoid weak instrument problems in the identica-
tion of the eect of interest, we use interactions between the instrument and other
control variables, involved in the matrix X1, as additional instruments.11 This
allows for more exogenous variation, since the introduction of a public health
care system can have heterogenous eects with respect to the initial economic
situation. The matrix X2 is not interacted in order to avoid problems with too
many instruments providing little additional explanatory power. The rst stage
regression is given by
m = b 1z + b 
0
2(X1  diag(z
0z)) + b 
0
1X1 + b 
0
2X2 + b v;
where the instrument z (dimension 1  S) is equal to one when a public health
insurance is introduced in t 1 and zero otherwise. The estimated residual vector
is denoted by b v, with E[b v] = 0. The parameter b 2 is a k11 vector, the parameter
b j is a kj  1 vector (with j 2 1;2) and the coecient b 1 is a scalar.
In the second stage we use the predicted mortality growth (d m) as regressor,
y = e d m + e 
0
1X1 + e 
0
2X2 + e ";
where the residual vector is represented by e ", with E[e "] = 0. The parameter e j
is a kj  1 vector (with j 2 1;2) and the coecient e  is a scalar. The coecient
e  represents the estimated causal eect of interest. This setup makes implicit
functional form assumptions, in terms of assuming linearity. Even though we do
not think this parametric assumption reects the reality exactly, we think it is a
11Since we condition on X1, the identifying assumptions are also valid for the interaction between
the instrument z and X1, if z is exogenous conditional on X1 and X2 (see e.g., Angrist and
Pischke, 2008).
12good approximation for reality. Moreover, the specications estimated correspond
to the canonical empirical growth model as used by, e.g., Barro (1991), Durlauf,
Johnson, and Temple (2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
2.4 Preliminary Analysis and Reduced Form Eects
In Table 1, we show descriptive statistics for periods when the public health sys-
tems are unchanged and for periods when a universal public health care system is
introduced, separately. The lagged level of GDP per capita, which is an indicator
for the initial economic situation, is lower on average in periods when the public
health system has changed. Accordingly, we do not nd a systematic positive
correlation between the introduction of public health systems and the level of
economic development. This is also conrmed when considering the economic
and demographic growth rates. Only population growth is on average slightly
higher in periods when a public health care system is introduced. We do not
nd evidence that public health care systems are introduced systematically in
periods of fast economic or demographic growth. This supports the argument
that the exact timing of the introduction of a universal public health care system
is determined exogenously and not driven systematically by initial economic or
demographic growth rates.
Table 1: Summary statistics separated for periods when public health care system
is implemented.
Summary Statistics
Periods when Public Health Care System is unchanged (Insi;t = 0)
20-Year Frequency
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gdpci;t 72 8430.211 6952.132 1206.913 23912.280
gdpci;t 72 0.508 0.428 -0.382 2.830
popi;t 72 0.138 0.080 0.022 0.336
gdpi;t 72 0.717 0.496 -0.349 3.053
Periods when Public Health Care System is Implemented (Insi;t = 1)
20-Year Frequency
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gdpci;t 12 3875.220 1433.479 2126.270 6745.636
gdpci;t 12 0.345 0.225 -0.069 0.657
popi;t 12 0.175 0.082 0.009 0.295
gdpi;t 12 0.571 0.229 0.127 0.891
13Table 2: Logit regression of the dummy for the introduction of a universal public
health care system on GDP per capita growth, population growth, GDP growth
and control variables in levels.
Instrument (Insi;t)
20-Year Frequency







lgdpci;t -0.508** -0.655*** -0.577**
[0.243] [0.220] [0.236]
lpopi;t -0.057 0.103 -0.068
[0.068] [0.115] [0.074]
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Results from Logit regressions the dependent variable is the instrument, Insi;t. Robust standard errors are
in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
As plausibility test, we regress a dummy for the present introduction of an uni-
versal public health care system (Insi;t) on GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t),
population growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively.12 In order
to account for deviations from the long-run equilibrium we condition on log GDP
per capita (lgdpci;t) and log population size (lpopi;t), following the suggestions of
Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005). The results in Table 2 show insignicant
coecients for the economic growth rates. Only for population growth we nd
a weak inuence on the instrument. This inuence disappears as soon as we
condition on the initial economic situation. All other growth rates have an in-
signicant inuence and rather high standard errors. Accordingly, the economic
and demographic growth rates have no predictive power for the introduction of a
universal public health care system. As expected, the initial GDP per capita has
some predictive power on the introduction dates. In the nal specications we
do not use the present but the lagged introduction of an universal public health
care system as instrument (zi;t = Insi;t 1). Therefore, we are condent that
our identication strategy is not prone to reverse causality.
In Figure 3 we plot the growth rates in the dierent dimensions (mortality,
income, population) against the time before and after the introduction of a uni-
12Since the instrument is a binary outcome variable, we use a non-linear Logit specication.
14versal public health system. The introduction of a universal public health care
system occurs at time t =  5 years.13 In this gure we calculate average ve-year
growth rates, which are indicated by the dots. We regress the growth rates on
a constant, a time trend and allow for dierent coecients before and after the
introduction dates. The predicted growth rates are indicated by the solid line,
the 90% condence interval is within the dashed lines. Figure 3(a) depicts the
growth in infant mortality. After the introduction of a universal public health
system, the predicted infant mortality growth is 5.7 percentage points lower. This
dierence is only signicant at the 5%-level, however. The predicted growth of
crude death rates is not signicantly dierent after the introduction compared to
before as indicated by Figure 3(b). However, by looking at the average observed
values, we nd that the absolute change in crude death rates is substantially lower
in the rst decade after the introduction and increases only thereafter. Figure
3(c) plots the predicted growth in GDP per capita; this series shows a large dis-
continuity after time zero. After the introduction, the predicted growth rate is
4.6 percentage points higher. There is no signicant dierence in the predicted
population growth rates as depicted in Figure 3(d). After the introduction, the
dynamics of population growth change strongly, however. Aggregate GDP growth
increases signicantly after the introduction of a public health care system, as




As rst step of the analysis, we present the correlations between economic and
demographic development and mortality growth that are obtained from OLS
regressions. Tables 4 and 5 present results from regressions of the outcomes
(GDP per capita growth, population growth and aggregate GDP growth) on the
13In order to have more observations when displaying the reduced form eects, we use a shorter
time period than 20 years in this plot.
15measures of mortality change (infant mortality and crude death rates, respec-
tively). As suggested by Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) we condition in
all specications on the lagged log GDP per capita (lgdpci;t 1) and the lagged
log population size (lpopi;t 1). This specication allows us to account for devi-
ations from long-run equilibrium. Moreover, we condition on a lagged dummy
for countries that have completed their demographic transition in the respective
period (PostTransi;t 1), based on evidence by Cervellati and Sunde (2011) that
the level of demographic development is an important factor for the eect of life
expectancy on growth.14 We distinguish between four specications. In the rst
specication we include a linear year trend. In the second specication, we al-
low for country specic linear year trends. In the third specication, we include
period xed eects. In the fourth specication, we include a linear time trend
as well as country-specic intercepts (xed eects).15 We nd that a one per-
centage point reduction in infant mortality growth (imri;t) increases GDP per
capita growth (gdpci;t) by about 0.6 percentage points, has no signicant eect
on population growth (popi;t), and reduces GDP growth (gdpi;t) by about
0.8 percentage points. According to Table 5, a one percentage point reduction
in crude death growth (cdri;t) has no or only a marginally signicant positive
eect on GDP per capita growth, increases population growth by about 0.1-0.2
percentage points, and has a positive eect on GDP growth in the specication
with period xed eects. The eects vary substantially across the dierent model
specications. Since we expect reverse causality and a negative relationship be-
tween economic and demographic growth and mortality growth, we suspect that
the coecients have a positive bias.16 The causal coecients are expected to be
14Following Chesnais (1992), we dene a country to be post-transitional when the crude death
rate is lower than a certain threshold,
PostTransi;t 1 =

1 when cdri;t 1  cdr;
0 when cdri;t 1 > cdr;





i=t si;t  cdri;t.
15In unreported specications, we also included a quadratic year trend and war dummies. Since
the general results do not change, we dropped these variables from the nal specications.
16The exogenous change in mortality growth is expected to be smaller than observed, since
interdependencies with economic and demographic growth increase the observed change. We
expect a negative eect of mortality growth on income and population growth, as well as a
negative eect of income growth on mortality growth. Therefore, a small exogenous change in
16smaller (more negative).
In the next step we apply the instrumental variable approach described in the
last subsection. In Tables 6 and 7, we report the rst stage estimation results
for infant mortality and crude death rate growth, respectively. As suspected, we
nd that the interaction eects play an important role in predicting the health
variables. The instrument and most of the interactions have a signicant inuence
on infant mortality growth and crude death growth, respectively. F-tests for the
joint inuence of all coecients which involve the instrument suggest a highly
signicant joint inuence in all specications.17 Also, the rst stage explains
a substantial portion of the variation of the health variables. The rst stage
statistics suggest that the instruments have sucient power to identify exogenous
variation in the crude death growth.
Table 8 presents estimation results of the causal eect of changes in mortality,
in terms of infant mortality growth, from the second stage of 2SLS estimations.
The results in the rst panel suggests a signicant negative eect of infant mor-
tality growth on growth in GDP per capita. We nd that a one percentage point
increase in infant mortality growth, leads to a reduction in GDP per capita growth
by about 1.5 percentage points. In the specication (4a), where we include coun-
try dummies and a linear year trend, the eect is 1.5 percentage points. In the
second panel of Table 8, we estimate the causal eect of infant mortality growth
on population growth. The absolute size of coecients of infant mortality growth
increase only slightly compared to the OLS results and are still insignicant, which
suggests that infant mortality growth has little inuence on population growth.
The last panel of Table 8 contains the the results regarding the causal eect of
infant mortality growth for GDP growth. A one percentage point increase in
infant mortality growth reduces GDP growth by 1.7-1.9 percentage points.
mortality growth is multiplied to a larger observed change.
17Because of the high number of interaction terms and the one-o variation in the instrument,
there might be a problem of multicollinearity. This is no reason for concern, however, since the
rst stage is only a prediction model and we do not aim to draw any causal conclusions from the
coecient estimates, such that multicollinearity does not matter. In contrast, multicollinearity
can even help, because it increases the predictive power of the model (see e.g., Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). As sensitivity analysis for the rst stage we applied an outlier analysis. We
could not nd any outlier with a strong impact on the estimates. The results of the outlier
analysis are available upon request.
17In Table 9 we present the corresponding IV results for crude death rate growth
as measure for variation in health conditions. The eect on GDP per capita
growth turns negative, but is still insignicant except for the specication with
period xed eects. On the other hand, the eect on population growth is signi-
cant and even stronger (with a coecient between -0.18 and -0.34). The eect on
GDP growth are all negative, but only signicant in the specication with period
xed eects.
The bottom of Tables 8 and 9 presents some rst stage statistics. The Shea's
R2 is always higher than 0.15 which indicates that the instruments have substan-
tial explanatory power. The same conclusion can be drawn from the rst stage
F-Statistic, where the null hypothesis of weak identication can be rejected. We
also report the Hansen's J Statistic, because we use a large number of interactions
as instrument. The null hypothesis can generally not be rejected, suggesting that
we do not face a considerable problem of too many instruments with little addi-
tional explanatory power. In the lower part of each panel of Tables 8 and 9, we
also present the results of a Hausman specication test. We regress the outcome
variable (GDP per capita growth, population growth or aggregate GDP growth)
on the observed change in mortality (infant mortality growth and crude death
growth, respectively) and the estimated error from the rst stage. Signicant
coecients for the error term would indicate problems of endogeneity in the OLS
regressions, otherwise, the problem of reverse causality is less severe in the growth
rates. We nd signicant endogeneity between infant mortality growth and GDP
per capita growth and GDP growth, respectively. However, the eect of infant
mortality growth on population growth does not dier signicantly between OLS
and 2SLS estimates. Also for the crude death growth we do not nd any sig-
nicant indication for endogeneity at all. This indicates that the use of growth
rates instead of levels in the outcome equation, as well as the sample construction
already solves large parts of the endogeneity issues of the crude death rate.
Overall, the results suggest that the eect of infant mortality growth on GDP
per capita growth and GDP growth is negative, and we nd no eect on popu-
lation growth. Crude death growth, in turn, has zero eect on GDP per capita
18growth and GDP growth, and a negative eect on population growth.18
Despite the evidence from the rst stage statistics, the 2SLS results might be
biased due to the relatively large number of instruments, some of which might
be weak. In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we replicate our
analysis using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) methods, which
imply a lower bias than 2SLS estimates, in particular in small samples (see, e.g.,
Flores-Lagunes, 2007, and Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Tables 10 and 11 present
the results for infant mortality and crude death rate growth, respectively. The
results are qualitatively as well as quantitatively very similar to those obtained
with 2SLS, even though the standard errors are larger as is to be expected with
LIML. Taken together, however, the results suggests that the bias of the IV results
is at best modest.
3.2 Inuence of Institutions
As discussed above, institutions can also have an important inuence on economic
and demographic growth (see e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). In
order to account for this inuence, we use three dierent measures for institu-
tions. We use a dummy for democratization, which is equal to one in the period
after election rules are introduced and zero otherwise (ElectRulesi;t 1). Intro-
duction dates of election rules are collected from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Another measure is the age of these election rules (AgeElectRulesi;t 1). This
variable is equal to zero before the introduction of election rules and afterwards
corresponds to the dierence between the respective observation year and the
introduction year. Finally, we use political regime dummies from the Polity IV
Project. We distinguish between autocracies, democracies and anocracies. The
omitted category are anocracies, which are mixed or incoherent authority regimes.
Regression results are presented in Table 12. In all models we use our rst
baseline specication, where we include a year trend.19 The dierences in the coef-
18The results are essentially unchanged when adding lags of m as additional controls. The
respective coecients are not signicantly dierent from zero.
19We do not nd strong dierences in the other three specications used in the baseline results.
Thus we concentrate here on the most simple specications. However, the results are robust in
the other specications.
19cients compared to the benchmark results are marginal. We apply a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test to check for signicant dierences between the coecient
of mortality growth, relative to the baseline model.20 We do not nd a signicant
dierence in any of the models. Accordingly, the institution variables cannot ac-
count for the inuence of mortality growth on economic and demographic growth,
i.e., the eect of mortality changes on economic development does not appear to
be just an indirect eect of institutions, and accounting for institutions does
also not damage our identication strategy.21 However, especially for population
growth, institutions have some additional explanatory power.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Additional Controls
Up to this point, the focus was mainly on the problem of reverse causality, since
this is the most serve endogeneity problem in empirical growth models. Another
potential problem could be a direct eect of the instrument on the outcome vari-
able. Eventually, this would imply that there exists an omitted variable that is
jointly correlated with the instrument, the change in mortality, and economic or
demographic development. In this case, the results obtained with our identica-
tion strategy would still be biased.
Such an omitted variable could be the share of people working in the health
service sector, or, more broadly, the service sector in general. The introduction
of a universal public health care system could increase the number of doctors,
nurses and chemists. People who work in the service sector have lower mortality
rates, since the probability of an accident is much lower in such occupations.
Finally, the fraction of people working in the health sector could be correlated
with economic and demographic growth, since it is an indicator for structural
change. In order to account for potential biases, we would ideally condition on
the fraction of people working in the service sector. This variable is not available,
20We calculate a heteroscedasticity robust DWH statistic following Baum and Schaer (2003).
21The results for crude death rate growth are also qualitatively unchanged and are available upon
request.
20but we have as proxy the fraction of GDP by sector of origin. We distinguish
between the agricultural, industrial and service sectors. Since the shares sum up
to one, we use the service sector as omitted category. Unfortunately, we do not
have the fraction of GDP by sector for all countries in all time periods under
observation. It is for example dicult to get these fractions for Switzerland.
In order to receive comparable results, we rst repeat our baseline specication
with the smaller sample. Then we include the additional control variables and
use a DWH test to control for signicant dierences in the coecient of interest.
Because of the low number of observations, we use the most parsimonious baseline
specication, where we include a year trend. Also, in light of the nding that the
change in crude death rates appears to be aected less by reverse causality, we
concentrate on infant mortality growth in the following.22 Results can be found
in Table 13. The coecients of interest remain robust when including control
variables for structural change, we do not nd any signicant dierence to the
baseline specication.23
Additionally, one might argue that it is important to condition for govern-
ment expenditure. The introduction of a universal public health system could
be rather expensive and could have a direct eect on economic growth and via
the larger income also on mortality growth. However, Lindert (2004) argues that
developed countries show much care in choosing the design of taxes and trans-
fers so as to avoid compromising growth. We can observe public consumption
as share of total GDP (%PubConsi;t 1) in the data. Results including public
consumption as additional control are reported in Table 14. We do not nd any
signicant dierence in the coecient of infant mortality growth in comparison
to the baseline model with this smaller sample. Additionally, one could argue,
22A complete analysis was also done for crude death growth. We do not nd any incidence
for additional endogeneity which would aect our results. In some specications we nd even
signicant negative eects of crude death growth on GDP per capita growth and GDP growth,
respectively. These could be driven by the smaller sample size. All robustness checks are
available upon request.
23The rst stage F-Statistic takes often low values in the robustness checks. The reason is
that in many instances we do not observe the additional control variables in the period after
the introduction of a universal public health care system. Therefore, we do not only have a
lower number of observations in the sample, but even less observations in the period after the
introduction. In light of this, we nd it worth noting that the F-Statistic is in all specications
still signicant at the 5%-level and the Shea's R2 is considerably high.
21that not the share of public consumption has an inuence on the coecients of
interest, but the change in public consumption, following an argument that only
changes in scal policy inuence economic development. In Table 15 we condi-
tion on the lagged relative public consumption growth (%PubConsi;t 1). The
coecients of infant mortality growth are not signicantly dierent. The eect
of infant mortality growth on population growth even becomes signicant, but
this can be explained by the dierent sample composition.
It could also be that individuals have a higher work-life satisfaction after
the introduction of a universal public health care system, because they have the
feeling that the government takes care of them. Higher satisfaction could have
an inuence on health as well as on economic development, since more satised
individuals could have a higher productivity. We use the lagged number of labor
disputes (per million workers) (#Dispi;t 1) and the lagged number of workers
involved in labor disputes (per million workers) (#Worki;t 1) as proxy for work-
life satisfaction. Since we have a number of autocratic (terror) regimes in our
sample, where the population is potentially very unsatised, but is not allowed
to demonstrate, we additionally condition on democracies. Results can be found
in Table 16. According to the DWH test, the coecient of interest do not change
signicantly. In order to have also a dierent proxy for work-life satisfaction we
include the lagged number of days lost in labor disputes (per million workers)
(DaysLosti;t 1) in the regressions of Table 17. Again the coecient of interest
does not change according to the DWH test.
Finally, one could argue that our estimation model is misspecied since one
needs to condition on the gross capital formation according to the prediction of
the Solow growth model. For a small number of observations we have data on
the gross capital formation as share of total GDP (%GCFi;t 1). In Table 18
we nd that the eect of infant mortality growth on GDP per capita growth
dier signicantly at the 10%-level when we condition on gross capital formation.
The eect is even more negative. If anything, our baseline specications would
underestimate the true absolute eect of infant mortality growth on GDP per
capita growth. The eects on population growth and GDP growth are unaected
22by the inclusion of gross capital formation.
4.2 Placebo Treatments
As another robustness check, we apply a placebo treatment test. As placebo
treatment, we articially set the instrument equal to one one period `too early'.24
Accordingly, the instrument is equal to one in the period of introduction and not
one period after the introduction of a universal public health care system. Since
there is not enough adjustment time for the mechanisms that aect changes in
mortality, we expect zero eect at the rst stage. This raises the problem of
weak identication. In Table 19 we display the rst stage of the placebo treat-
ment test for the baseline specications. As expected, the instrument and the
interaction have virtually no eect on mortality growth. Without a single excep-
tion, all coecients in all specications are insignicant. We perform a test for
joint signicance. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no joint inuence in
all specications at the 1%-level. In Table 19 we also show the rst stage statis-
tics. The Shea's R2 and the F-Statistic are rather low, which indicates that the
placebo-instrument has nearly no power despite a comparably large number of
observations as in the main analysis. In the second stage, the coecients of inter-
est are insignicant and have high standard errors, as shown in Table 20. Nearly
all coecients change sign and become positive. We interpret this as indication
that our identication strategy passes the placebo treatment test.25 This also
suggests that it it unlikely that the previous results are driven by common time
trends or random shocks. Moreover, this supports our initial assumptions about
the causal channel, namely that rst the universal public health care systems
were introduced and then the eects on economic and demographic development
unfolded, and not vice versa.
24A delayed placebo makes less sense since the placebo might pick up delayed treatment eects
as the spread of health system coverage. Similarly, indirect eects like demographic change and
education might become active with a delay.
25Similar results are obtained for crude death growth.
234.3 Dierent Data Frequencies
One important parameter in our empirical analysis is the choice of the data
frequency. The choice of a 20-year data frequency is to some extent arbitrary. In
our identication approach, the data frequency has two important implications.
On the one hand, we want a fairly short data frequency, because otherwise the
instrument has no power on mortality growth. In the long run, the eect of
the introduction of a universal public health care system diminishes. On the
other hand, we need a suciently long data frequency, because we expect that
the eects of mortality change on economic and demographic development have
a rather long run character and need time to unfold. If the data frequency is
too short, mortality growth has no inuence on the outcome variables. In this
section, we therefore investigate the sensitivity of our results for alternative data
frequencies of 15- and 30-year periods.
Table 21 shows the estimation results with 15-year data frequency. The main
results remain robust. Infant mortality growth has a negative eect on GDP per
capita growth and GDP growth and no signicant eect on population growth.
The coecients are smaller, which indicates that infant mortality has a smaller
eect on economic and demographic growth in the short run.
Table 22 shows the results for 30-year data frequency. The number of ob-
servations is very small. The size of the coecients is even larger than for the
20-year data frequency, but the coecients are insignicant because of the high
standard errors. Only in specication 3, where we include period dummies, the
eect of interest is smaller. When we increase the data frequency further to 40
years, the coecients of interest get even larger. However, the rst stage has less
power and the number of observations decreases to 35. For crude death growth
we nd that the instrument has strong power independent of the data frequency.
The coecient estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively unaected by the
data frequency.26 In summary, we conclude that our estimates might potentially
not capture the total eect of mortality growth on economic and demographic
growth. Our ndings might nevertheless be valid for the medium term. Long run
26Results are available upon request.
24eects of mortality growth on economic and demographic growth could be even
stronger, but are dicult to identify with our identication strategy.
5 Conclusion
This paper has applied a novel identication strategy based on the timing of
the implementation of a universal public health system to estimate the causal
eect of mortality changes on economic growth and population growth. The
results indicate that a reduction in mortality accelerates growth of income per
capita and population size. The results reconcile earlier ndings in the literature
by documenting a positive eect of mortality reductions on growth based on an
identication strategy that exploits within-country over-time variation, suggest-
ing that the discrepancies in earlier ndings might be the result of dierences
in sample composition, rather than identication method. Moreover, our results
suggest that public health policy plays a potentially important role for economic
development.
Naturally, there are caveats to our analysis that need to be taken into account
when interpreting our results. First, the ndings are based on a small sample,
with the identifying variation stemming from European countries in the late 19th
and early 20th Century. As in previous studies, sample composition might aect
the generality and external validity of our results. Nevertheless, given the partic-
ular sample, the results can be seen as a complement to studies using exclusively
cross-country variation in geo-climatological conditions (as in Lorentzen et al.,
2008) or using within country variation during a very particular period of global
development (as the global epidemiological transition exploited by Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2007).
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28Figure 1: Timing of Events: Data Preparation
Figure 2: Timing of Events: Construction of the Instrument zi;t.
29Figure 3: Growth rates before and after the introduction of an universal public
health care system (t=-5).
(a) infant mortality growth (b) crude death rate growth
(c) GDP per capita growth (d) population growth
(e) GDP growth
30Table 3: Summary statistics.
Summary Statistics
20-Year Frequency
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
imri;t 84 -0.358 0.232 -0.752 0.370
cdri;t 84 -0.110 0.146 -0.508 0.327
gdpci;t 84 0.485 0.408 -0.382 2.830
popi;t 84 0.143 0.081 0.009 0.336
gdpi;t 84 0.696 0.469 -0.349 3.053
lgdpci;t 1 84 8.238 0.761 6.829 9.763
lpopi;t 1 84 9.151 1.099 7.262 10.954
PostTransi;t 1 84 0.488 0.503 0 1
ElectRulesi;t 1 84 0.119 0.326 0 1
AgeElectRulesi;t 1 84 20.095 31.755 0 151
Autocraciesi;t 1 82 0.073 0.262 0 1
Democraciesi;t 1 82 0.622 0.488 0 1
%Industryi;t 1 52 34.173 8.915 18.800 50.600
%Agrii;t 1 52 22.362 16.933 2.000 55.000
%GovExpi;t 1 65 13.411 9.439 0.765 44.193
%GovExpi;t 1 50 0.483 0.650 -0.446 2.157
#Dispi;t 1 51 2.440 5.619 0.002 23.780
#Worki;t 1 54 25.624 57.109 0.010 311.870
DaysLosti;t 1 51 0.230 0.331 0.000 1.186
%GCFi;t 1 54 16.321 6.628 5.657 29.200
Y ear 84 1938.476 41.930 1850 2008
31Table 4: OLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population growth and GDP
growth on infant mortality growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
imri;t -0.683*** -0.663*** -0.719*** -0.502*
[0.172] [0.199] [0.155] [0.264]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.414** -0.416* -0.512** -0.567
[0.181] [0.214] [0.168] [0.331]
lpopi;t 1 -0.006 0.010 -0.008 -0.118
[0.017] [0.026] [0.019] [0.221]
PostTransi;t 1 0.342* 0.384 0.143 0.404
[0.189] [0.214] [0.114] [0.231]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.478 0.516 0.671 0.515
Observations 84 84 84 84
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
imri;t -0.043 -0.051 -0.019 -0.018
[0.065] [0.089] [0.051] [0.057]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.016 -0.011 -0.020 -0.052
[0.027] [0.031] [0.021] [0.037]
lpopi;t 1 -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.163**
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.067]
PostTransi;t 1 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.020
[0.026] [0.034] [0.026] [0.033]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.257 0.448 0.279 0.556
Observations 84 84 84 84
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
imri;t -0.869*** -0.865*** -0.851*** -0.636*
[0.195] [0.227] [0.163] [0.317]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.483** -0.482** -0.599*** -0.702**
[0.174] [0.211] [0.159] [0.318]
lpopi;t 1 -0.044** -0.032 -0.045* -0.312
[0.018] [0.028] [0.024] [0.267]
PostTransi;t 1 0.490* 0.531* 0.244 0.499*
[0.228] [0.259] [0.139] [0.264]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.464 0.501 0.648 0.505
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from OLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population growth
(popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate
signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
32Table 5: OLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population growth and GDP
growth on crude death rate growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
cdri;t 0.169 0.169 -0.425* 0.379
[0.247] [0.290] [0.201] [0.406]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.498** -0.484* -0.537** -0.739**
[0.190] [0.226] [0.178] [0.310]
lpopi;t 1 -0.010 0.006 -0.016 -0.216
[0.023] [0.033] [0.019] [0.248]
PostTransi;t 1 0.385* 0.431* 0.188 0.403*
[0.187] [0.213] [0.134] [0.207]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.437 0.481 0.638 0.509
Observations 84 84 84 84
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
cdri;t -0.161*** -0.134*** -0.192*** -0.111***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.048] [0.029]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.011 -0.008 -0.030 -0.037
[0.022] [0.023] [0.019] [0.035]
lpopi;t 1 -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.146**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.059]
PostTransi;t 1 0.040 0.035 0.032
[0.029] [0.033] [0.026] [0.031]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.329 0.492 0.358 0.586
Observations 84 84 84 84
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
20-Year-Frequency
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
cdri;t -0.073 -0.035 -0.765*** 0.216
[0.288] [0.331] [0.207] [0.430]
lgdpc i,t-1 -0.571** -0.556** -0.641*** -0.875**
[0.188] [0.229] [0.165] [0.303]
lpop i,t-1 -0.049* -0.038 -0.057** -0.394
[0.024] [0.037] [0.025] [0.273]
PostTrans i,t-1 0.490* 0.531* 0.244 0.499*
[0.223] [0.252] [0.155] [0.241]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
R-squared 0.410 0.451 0.634 0.484
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from OLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population growth
(popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate
signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
33Table 6: First stage: 2SLS regression of infant mortality growth on the instru-
ments and other controls.
Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Growth (imri;t)
20-Year Frequency
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Insi;t 1 -0.436 -0.239 1.356 -0.970
[1.086] [1.187] [0.989] [1.188]
Insi;t 1  lgdpci;t 1 -0.079 -0.118 -0.166 -0.024
[0.164] [0.177] [0.127] [0.175]
Insi;t 1  lpopi;t 1 0.117** 0.132** 0.013 0.131**
[0.043] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045]
Insi;t 1  PostTransi;t 1 0.208** 0.191** 0.208*** 0.208**
[0.074] [0.085] [0.063] [0.086]
Insi;t 1  Y earTrend -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Insi;t 1  D(Y ear1920) -0.268**
[0.108]
Insi;t 1  D(1920<Y ear1935) -0.372**
[0.130]
Insi;t 1  D(1950<Y ear1965) -0.472***
[0.131]
Insi;t 1  D(1965<Y ear) -0.163
[0.163]
lgdpci;t 1 0.110*** 0.082* 0.035 0.202***
[0.032] [0.042] [0.024] [0.047]
lpopi;t 1 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.104
[0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.163]
PostTransi;t 1 -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.083 -0.132***
[0.042] [0.040] [0.052] [0.040]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Dummies No No No Yes
Joint F-Test (Ins i;t   1) 18.96 16.95 9.743 62.40
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
R-squared 0.754 0.784 0.766 0.792
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions (rst stage), the dependent variables is infant mortality growth (imri;t), re-
spectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and
interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and
10-percent level, respectively.
34Table 7: First stage: 2SLS regression of crude death rate growth on the instru-
ments and other controls.
Dependent Variable: Crude Death Rate Growth (cdri;t)
20-Year Frequency
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Insi;t 1 -3.334*** -3.888*** -2.145** -3.965***
[0.690] [0.759] [0.756] [0.707]
Insi;t 1  lgdpci;t 1 0.295** 0.344** 0.180 0.350***
[0.103] [0.113] [0.102] [0.106]
Insi;t 1  lpopi;t 1 0.097** 0.117*** 0.060** 0.120***
[0.032] [0.030] [0.024] [0.031]
Insi;t 1  PostTrans i;t   1 0.123 0.153 0.108 0.148
[0.094] [0.098] [0.077] [0.108]
Insi;t 1  Y earTrend -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Insi;t 1  D(Y ear1920) 0.067
[0.139]
Insi;t 1  D(1920<Y ear1935) 0.128
[0.111]
Insi;t 1  D(1950<Y ear1965) -0.153
[0.092]
Insi;t 1  D(1965<Y ear) -0.099
[0.142]
lgdpci;t 1 0.021 0.003 -0.044 0.127
[0.051] [0.062] [0.027] [0.098]
lpopi;t 1 -0.013 -0.011 -0.015 0.205**
[0.015] [0.017] [0.014] [0.090]
PostTransi;t 1 0.062 0.055 0.029 0.074
[0.074] [0.075] [0.070] [0.088]
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Dummies No No No Yes
Joint F-Test (Ins i;t   1) 11.74 17.55 9.053 22.90
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
R-squared 0.275 0.344 0.440 0.429
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions (rst stage), the dependent variables is crude death rate growth (cdri;t), re-
spectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and
interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and
10-percent level, respectively.
35Table 8: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth, and GDP growth on infant mortality growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
\ imri;t -1.529*** -1.337*** -1.358*** -1.543***
[0.481] [0.372] [0.490] [0.446]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.324** -0.357** -0.509*** -0.346
[0.165] [0.180] [0.149] [0.281]
lpopi;t 1 -0.002 0.014 -0.004 -0.040
[0.014] [0.020] [0.019] [0.244]
PostTransi;t 1 0.267 0.319* 0.132 0.319*
[0.163] [0.177] [0.099] [0.181]
Hansen J Statistic 2.423 2.218 8.984 3.040
p-value 0.658 0.696 0.254 0.551
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 2.564 2.359 1.586 2.365
p-value 0.026 0.038 0.141 0.037
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
\ imri;t -0.094 -0.118 -0.117 -0.069
[0.134] [0.137] [0.130] [0.147]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.011 -0.005 -0.020 -0.041
[0.031] [0.031] [0.020] [0.039]
lpopi;t 1 -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.159***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.060]
PostTransi;t 1 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.016
[0.029] [0.034] [0.026] [0.032]
Hansen J Statistic 6.692 7.248 9.686 4.243
p-value 0.153 0.123 0.207 0.374
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 0.396 0.554 0.983 0.372
p-value 0.700 0.590 0.347 0.717
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
\ imri;t -1.990*** -1.795*** -1.745*** -1.943***
[0.635] [0.529] [0.665] [0.582]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.364** -0.400** -0.595*** -0.424
[0.155] [0.180] [0.140] [0.301]
lpopi;t 1 -0.038** -0.027 -0.040 -0.214
[0.015] [0.022] [0.024] [0.336]
PostTransi;t 1 0.307 0.356 0.154 0.364*
[0.207] [0.221] [0.127] [0.221]
Hansen J Statistic 0.730 0.913 10.93 1.073
p-value 0.948 0.923 0.142 0.898
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 2.706 2.451 1.629 3.103
p-value 0.020 0.032 0.132 0.010
Specication (all panels)
20-Year-Frequency
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
First Stage Statistics (all panels)
Shea's R-Squared 0.158 0.207 0.195 0.172
F-Statistic 18.962 16.949 9.743 62.395
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP growth (gdpi;t), population growth (popi;t)
and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. Each panel represents a separate set of regressions. The instruments
are a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). First
stages are as in Table 6 and are identical for each specication. Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***,
**,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 36Table 9: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on crude death rate growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
[ cdri;t -0.230 -0.203 -1.141** -0.341
[0.558] [0.513] [0.476] [0.541]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.472*** -0.464** -0.572*** -0.616**
[0.183] [0.197] [0.177] [0.282]
lpopi;t 1 -0.010 0.006 -0.022 -0.101
[0.021] [0.028] [0.019] [0.223]
PostTransi;t 1 0.425** 0.466** 0.244* 0.483**
[0.174] [0.190] [0.133] [0.199]
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 5.523 5.352 8.670 6.308
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 0.701 0.657 1.364 1.225
p-value 0.498 0.525 0.200 0.246
p-value 0.238 0.253 0.277 0.177
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
[ cdri;t -0.227** -0.177** -0.339*** -0.183**
[0.103] [0.073] [0.107] [0.072]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.037*** -0.025
[0.022] [0.020] [0.014] [0.031]
lpopi;t 1 -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.135***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.046]
PostTransi;t 1 0.046 0.039 0.043 0.042
[0.032] [0.031] [0.029] [0.030]
Hansen J Statistic 2.414 0.854 6.542 1.506
p-value 0.660 0.931 0.478 0.826
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 0.573 0.434 0.215 0.914
p-value 0.578 0.673 0.834 0.380
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
[ cdri;t -0.692 -0.567 -1.845*** -0.727
[0.634] [0.637] [0.546] [0.654]
lgdpci;t 1 -0.531*** -0.527*** -0.695*** -0.714***
[0.173] [0.197] [0.171] [0.274]
lpopi;t 1 -0.049** -0.038 -0.066*** -0.244
[0.022] [0.031] [0.025] [0.225]
PostTransi;t 1 0.551** 0.580** 0.328** 0.604**
[0.220] [0.228] [0.163] [0.235]
Hansen J Statistic 5.225 5.221 7.683 4.222
p-value 0.265 0.265 0.361 0.377
Hausman Test (T-Stat) 0.901 0.735 1.424 1.321
p-value 0.387 0.477 0.182 0.213
Specication (all panels)
20-Year-Frequency
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
First Stage Statistics (all panels)
Shea's R-Squared 0.193 0.234 0.155 0.253
F-Statistic 11.74 17.554 10.411 22.904
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP growth (gdpi;t), population growth (popi;t)
and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. Each panel represents a separate set of regressions. The instruments
are a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). First
stages are as in Table 7 and are identical for each specication. Robust standard errors are in brackets; ***,
**,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
37Table 10: LIML estimation results for GDP per capita growth, population growth
and GDP growth on infant mortality growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
imri;t -1.754** -1.510* -1.791** -1.774*
[0.885] [0.797] [0.836] [0.941]
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
imri;t -.119 -.132 -.185 -.119
[0.226] [0.156] [0.233] [0.254]
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
imri;t -2.079** -1.895** -2.274** -2.098**
[0.904] [0.846] [0.971] [1.020]
Specication (all panels)
20-Year-Frequency
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from LIML estimations with Bekker (1994) adjustment, the dependent variables are GDP per capita
growth (gdpci;t), population growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are
a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Standard
errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
38Table 11: LIML estimation results for GDP per capita growth, population growth
and GDP growth on crude death rate growth and other controls.
Dependent Variable: GDP per Capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
cdri;t -.582 -.477 -2.407 -.712
[1.024] [0.898] [1.786] [0.819]
Dependent Variable: Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
cdri;t -.234* -.179 -.391* -.198*
[0.135] [0.112] [0.218] [0.116]
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
cdri;t -1.035 -.869 -2.951* -1.074
[1.023] [0.975] [1.576] [0.891]
Specication (all panels)
20-Year-Frequency
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from LIML estimations with Bekker (1994) adjustment, the dependent variables are GDP per capita
growth (gdpci;t), population growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are
a dummy for the introduction of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Standard
errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
39Table 12: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, democratization variables
and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -1.456*** -1.519*** -0.102 -0.132 -1.922*** -2.063***
[0.420] [0.560] [0.136] [0.159] [0.576] [0.733]
ElectRulesi;t 1 -0.014 -0.027** -0.092
[0.155] [0.013] [0.163]
AgeElectRulesi;t 1 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002]
Autocraciesi;t 1 0.012 0.011 0.060
[0.147] [0.024] [0.160]
Democraciesi;t 1 0.064 -0.035* 0.014
[0.093] [0.020] [0.118]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
DWH-Statistic 0.034 0.000 0.003 0.060 0.015 0.011
P-value 0.854 0.984 0.954 0.806 0.903 0.918
Shea's R-Squared 0.161 0.147 0.161 0.147 0.161 0.147
F-Statistic 16.852 13.423 16.852 13.423 16.852 13.423
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 2.652 2.302 5.561 8.855 0.977 0.697
p-value 0.618 0.680 0.234 0.0648 0.913 0.952
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
40Table 13: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, sector of origin as percentage
of total GDP and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -1.536*** -1.655*** -0.197 -0.210 -2.151*** -2.296***
[0.238] [0.261] [0.135] [0.164] [0.373] [0.383]
%Agriculturei;t 1 0.015** 0.001 0.018***
[0.007] [0.002] [0.007]
%Industryi;t 1 0.016** -0.003* 0.012
[0.007] [0.002] [0.007]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 0.251 . 0.007 . 0.148
P-value . 0.617 . 0.936 . 0.701
Shea's R-Squared 0.273 0.269 0.273 0.269 0.273 0.269
F-Statistic 5.179 5.215 5.179 5.215 5.179 5.215
p-value 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Hansen J Statistic 3.576 5.586 6.286 5.604 2.998 2.490
p-value 0.466 0.232 0.179 0.231 0.558 0.646
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
41Table 14: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, government expenditure as
percentage of total GDP and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -2.076*** -2.183*** -0.172** -0.156 -2.727*** -2.826***
[0.606] [0.693] [0.082] [0.098] [0.705] [0.806]
%PubConsi;t 1 0.004 -0.001 0.004
[0.005] [0.001] [0.007]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 0.025 . 0.027 . 0.016
P-value . 0.874 . 0.870 . 0.899
Shea's R-Squared 0.141 0.126 0.141 0.126 0.141 0.126
F-Statistic 8.396 3.858 8.396 3.858 8.396 3.858
p-value 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.029
Hansen J Statistic 1.139 1.025 1.886 1.762 0.581 0.523
p-value 0.888 0.906 0.757 0.779 0.965 0.971
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
42Table 15: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, popula-
tion growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, relative government
expenditure growth and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -1.873** -1.967** -0.223** -0.227** -2.578*** -2.698***
[0.744] [0.814] [0.095] [0.109] [0.873] [0.960]
%PubConsi;t 1 -0.032 -0.002 -0.042
[0.072] [0.018] [0.103]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 0.014 . 0.001 . 0.016
P-value . 0.906 . 0.972 . 0.899
Shea's R-Squared 0.176 0.162 0.176 0.162 0.176 0.162
F-Statistic 4.882 3.197 4.882 3.197 4.882 3.197
p-value 0.013 0.050 0.013 0.050 0.013 0.050
Hansen J Statistic 4.084 3.658 2.404 2.396 1.129 1.019
p-value 0.395 0.454 0.662 0.663 0.890 0.907
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
43Table 16: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, number of labor disputes,
number of workers involved in labor disputes and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -1.402*** -1.405*** 0.132 -0.034 -1.425*** -1.718**
[0.375] [0.494] [0.082] [0.159] [0.523] [0.763]
Democraciesi;t 1 -0.112* -0.111 -0.021 -0.032 -0.163* -0.180*
[0.063] [0.074] [0.037] [0.034] [0.087] [0.102]
#Dispi;t 1 -0.005 -0.002* -0.010
[0.007] [0.001] [0.009]
#Worki;t 1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 0.000 . 1.169 . 0.154
P-value . 0.994 . 0.280 . 0.695
Shea's R-Squared 0.246 0.213 0.246 0.213 0.246 0.213
F-Statistic 19.815 16.221 19.815 16.221 19.815 16.221
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 3.479 1.628 5.903 6.154 2.112 0.855
p-value 0.481 0.804 0.207 0.188 0.715 0.931
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
44Table 17: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth, number of days lost in labor
disputes and other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -2.244*** -1.633*** 0.074 -0.009 -2.437*** -1.911***
[0.536] [0.430] [0.168] [0.145] [0.714] [0.431]
DaysLosti;t 1 -0.320** -0.023 -0.368**
[0.157] [0.026] [0.183]
Democraciesi;t 1 -0.096 -0.045 -0.049 -0.050 -0.187** -0.135*
[0.097] [0.088] [0.036] [0.033] [0.082] [0.082]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 2.458 . 0.373 . 1.674
P-value . 0.117 . 0.542 . 0.196
Shea's R-Squared 0.158 0.210 0.158 0.210 0.158 .210
F-Statistic 29.303 13.202 29.303 13.202 29.303 13.202
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 0.720 3.225 4.542 3.709 0.454 2.492
p-value 0.949 0.521 0.338 0.447 0.978 0.646
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
45Table 18: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth gross capital formation and
other controls.
gdpci;t popi;t gdpi;t
20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency 20-Year Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
\ imri;t -1.685*** -2.117*** -0.200 -0.163 -2.282*** -2.728***
[0.317] [0.419] [0.137] [0.139] [0.418] [0.597]
%GCFi;t 1 0.022** -0.002 0.023**
[0.009] [0.001] [0.011]
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DWH-Statistic . 3.187 . 0.625 . 1.467
P-value . 0.074 . 0.429 . 0.226
Shea's R-Squared 0.367 0.340 0.367 0.340 0.367 0.340
F-Statistic 11.123 6.635 11.123 6.635 11.123 6.635
p-value 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
Hansen J Statistic 1.127 4.984 2.568 2.608 2.454 6.103
p-value 0.890 0.289 0.632 0.625 0.653 0.192
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
46Table 19: First stage of placebo treatment test: Regression of infant mortality
growth on the placebo instruments and other controls. The instrument is set
equal to one always one period too early.
Infant Mortality Growth (imri;t)
20-Year Frequency
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Insi;t 4.282 3.255 -1.000 3.179
[4.024] [4.200] [2.228] [4.154]
Insi;t  PostTransi;t 1 -0.116 -0.208 -0.327 -0.211
[0.116] [0.125] [0.186] [0.125]
Insi;t  lgdpci;t 1 0.014 0.139 0.123 0.142
[0.181] [0.175] [0.302] [0.174]
Insi;t  lpopi;t 1 0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.004
[0.021] [0.020] [0.046] [0.020]
Insi;t  Y earTrend -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Insi;t  D(1920Y ear) 0.018
[0.180]
Insi;t  D(1920Y ear<1935) 0.070
[0.159]
lgdpci;t 1 0.105*** 0.210*** 0.009 0.217***
[0.027] [0.064] [0.017] [0.065]
lpopi;t 1 0.010 0.092 0.003 0.106
[0.012] [0.132] [0.011] [0.146]
PostTransi;t 1 -0.058 -0.041 0.051 -0.039
[0.061] [0.091] [0.061] [0.090]
Year Trend Yes Yes No
Period Dummies No No Yes
Country Dummies No Yes Yes
Joint F-Test (Ins i;t   1) 2.864 4.150 3.872 4.062
p-value 0.0680 0.0230 0.0290 0.0250
R-squared 0.725 0.766 0.746 0.767
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions (rst stage), the dependent variables are infant mortality growth (imri;t) and
crude death rate growth (cdri;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the placebo introduction
of an universal public health care system (one period too early) and interactions (see text). Robust standard
errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
47Table 20: Second stage placebo treatment test: 2SLS regression of GDP per
capita growth, population growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth
and other controls. The instrument is set equal to one always one period too
early.
GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
\ imri;t 1.380 0.973 -0.196 0.914
[0.936] [0.617] [0.846] [0.621]
Hansen J Statistic 5.752 4.283 2.974 4.294
p-value 0.218 0.369 0.562 0.368
Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
\ imri;t 0.024 0.149 -0.133 0.153
[0.283] [0.189] [0.255] [0.189]
Hansen J Statistic 2.921 2.590 2.492 2.725
p-value 0.571 0.629 0.646 0.605
GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
\ imri;t 1.640 1.307 -0.308 1.244
[1.083] [0.798] [0.933] [0.803]
Hansen J Statistic 5.944 4.937 3.169 4.974
p-value 0.203 0.294 0.530 0.290
Specication (all panels)
20-Year-Frequency
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
First Stage Statistics (all panels)
Shea's R-Squared 0.053 0.074 0.085 0.075
F-Statistic 2.864 4.15 3.872 4.062
p-value 0.068 0.023 0029 0.025
Observations 84 84 84 84
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the the placebo
introduction of an universal public health care system (one period too early) and interactions (see text). Robust
standard errors are in brackets; ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
48Table 21: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth and other controls (15-years
data frequency).
GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
\ imri;t -0.988*** -0.888** -0.544 -1.009***
[0.342] [0.361] [0.370] [0.363]
Hansen J Statistic 5.367 5.532 5.240 5.438
p-value 0.252 0.237 0.513 0.245
Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
\ imri;t -0.079 -0.108 -0.050 -0.066
[0.075] [0.089] [0.090] [0.094]
Hansen J Statistic 5.374 5.467 8.413 3.624
p-value 0.251 0.243 0.209 0.459
GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
\ imri;t -1.177*** -1.111*** -0.590 -1.169***
[0.350] [0.356] [0.444] [0.379]
Hansen J Statistic 3.430 4.196 6.276 3.527
p-value 0.489 0.380 0.393 0.474
Specication (all panels)
15-Year-Frequency
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
First Stage Statistics (all panels)
Shea's R-Squared 0.141 0.147 0.211 0.157
F-Statistic 4.559 3.383 10.677 4.277
p-value 0.017 0.043 0.000 0.021
Observations 109 109 109 109
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
49Table 22: Second stage: 2SLS regression of GDP per capita growth, population
growth and GDP growth on infant mortality growth and other controls (30-years
data frequency).
GDP per capita Growth (gdpci;t)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
\ imri;t -1.929 -2.339** -1.008 -2.052
[1.304] [1.051] [0.697] [1.733]
Hansen J Statistic 5.226 4.171 4.000 6.046
p-value 0.265 0.383 0.677 0.196
Population Growth (popi;t)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
\ imri;t -0.168 -0.202 -0.022 -0.186
[0.206] [0.216] [0.320] [0.207]
Hansen J Statistic 5.546 5.985 6.717 1.805
p-value 0.236 0.200 0.348 0.772
GDP Growth (gdpi;t)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
\ imri;t -2.767* -3.393** -1.254** -2.879
[1.593] [1.408] [0.604] [2.318]
Hansen J Statistic 4.307 3.883 4.234 5.257
p-value 0.366 0.422 0.645 0.262
Specication (all panels)
40-Year-Frequency
lgdpci;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
lpopi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PostTransi;t 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes No No Yes
Country Specic Year Trend No Yes No No
Period Dummies No No Yes No
Country Specic Constants No No No Yes
First Stage Statistics (all panels)
Shea's R-Squared 0.237 0.275 0.166 0.224
F-Statistic 4.718 5.511 72.359 3.109
p-value 0.015 0.009 0.000 0.054
Observations 49 49 49 49
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variables are GDP per capita growth (gdpci;t), population
growth (popi;t) and GDP growth (gdpi;t), respectively. The instruments are a dummy for the introduction
of an universal public health care system and interactions (see text). Robust standard errors are in brackets;
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
50A History of Public Health Insurance
Table 23: Introduction dates of a universal public health care system.
Country Introduction Source
Austria 1887 (Hofmarcher and Rack, 2001, p. 6)
Belgium 1894 (Corens, 2007, p. 15)
Denmark 1892 (Strandberg-Larsen et al., 2007, p. 19)
Finland 1944 (Vuorenkoski, 2008, p. 21)
France 1930 (Sandier, Paris, and Polton, 2004, p. 7)
Italy 1923 (Lo Scalzo et al., 2009, p. 17)
Netherlands 1941 (Sch afer et al., 2010, p. 13)
Norway 1912 (Johnsen, 2006, p. 13)
Spain 1942 (Dur an, Lara, and Van Waveren, 2006, p. 15)
Sweden 1955 (Glenng ard et al., 2005, p. 15)
Switzerland 1911 (Minder, Schoenholzer, and Amiet, 2000, p. 6)
United Kingdom 1948 (Robinson and Dixon, 1999, p. 5)
Austria: The industrial accident and health insurance scheme for workers
was introduced in 1887. It follows the model of Bismarck's social policy pro-
gram in Germany. It is the foundation of today's social security system (comp.
Hofmarcher and Rack, 2001, p. 6).
Belgium: Workers created mutual benet societies in the late 19th century,
in order to protect aliated members against the risk of disease, unemployment
and incapacity to work. These early voluntary sickness funds were of small scale,
organized according to employment type, and run as private initiatives, without
state subsidies. The legislation for a sickness funds', which served as the legal
foundation for about a century, was passed in 1894. This legislation extended
the ocial scope of the sickness funds' activities and introduced state subsidies
(comp. Corens, 2007, p. 15).
Denmark: During the second half of the 19th century, health insurance
in Denmark developed. Health insurance organizations were established by a
combination of artisans and other groups. The artisan groups created their own
help funds as an extension of the guilds funds, which were established by members
to provide mutual help. Since 1892, state subsidies are given to insurance schemes
(comp. Strandberg-Larsen, Nielsen, Vallg arda, Krasnik, and Vrangbk, 2007, p.
19).
Finland: Since the 1870s, municipalities have been responsible for providing
basic medical services. After the War, a new act was introduced to organize
municipal health care services. The right to maternal and child health care,
irrespective of residence and nancial situation, was established in 1944 (comp.
Vuorenkoski, 2008, p. 21).
51France: An act on social insurance was passed in 1930, signalling the emer-
gence of a universal insurance system. A system of compulsory protection for
employees in industry and business, whose earnings fell below a certain level, was
created by this legislation. Insurance was provided in ve areas: illness, mater-
nity, disability, old age and death (comp. Sandier, Paris, and Polton, 2004, p.
7).
Italy: In 1898, occupational accident insurance was introduced and in 1904
it became compulsory for workers in industry and in 1917 for agriculture. The
fascist regime (1922-1943), pushed several changes in the health care system
forward. In 1923, the right to hospital care for the needy and indigent population
was guaranteed for the rst time (comp. Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cicchetti,
Proli, and Maresso, 2009, p. 17).
Netherlands: The liberal Dutch traditions of the 19th century prevented the
government from taking initiatives related to health care and health insurance.
The 1913 sickness act marked the the start of government interference in the
health insurance sector. However, it took decades before a system of health
insurance came into operation. After many political conicts, implementation
of the 1913 sickness act was not achieved until 1930. Eventually, the act only
covered sickness benets, excluding medical expenses. Until the Second World
War all attempts to introduce a compulsory insurance system failed. This was
caused by resistance from health care providers. The main causes of conict
were provider participation in the sickness fund boards, the level of the income
threshold for people to be accepted to the funds and the conditions of being
accepted as a health care provider. A change was forced by the German occupying
forces in 1941 with the constraint of the sickness fund decree. It introduced
compulsory insurance for employees earning less than a certain income threshold
(comp. Sch afer, Kroneman, Boerma, Van den Berg, Westert, Devill e, and van
Ginneken, 2010, p. 13).
Norway: An increase in public responsibility for health matters, at the state
and the municipal levels, took place the beginning of the 20th century. At rst,
health care insurance schemes developed, based on individual applications. The
practitioners act of 1912 provided equal access to health services for everyone,
regardless of their income and settlement (comp. Johnsen, 2006, p. 13).
Spain: During the last quarter of the 19th century, the development of Span-
ish social protection began. The National Institute of Social Insurance (INP)
was created to coordinate implementation of the rst social insurance policies.
The rst attempt to develop social health insurance for low-salaried workers was
launched by the INP during the era of the Second Republic (1931-1936). In 1936,
the coup by General Franco started a civil war (1936-1939) that led to the estab-
lishment of an authoritarian regime. After the civil war, many of the previous
policy proposals were in some way recovered by the Francoist Government. Social
security-related health care was run through the INP from 1942 by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Security, until 1977 (comp. Dur an, Lara, and Van Waveren,
2006, p. 15).
Sweden: The rst important step towards universal coverage for physician
consultations, prescription drugs and sickness compensation was taken, when a
National Health Insurance Act was voted in by the Swedish Parliament in 1946
52(comp. Glenng ard, Hjalte, Svensson, Anell, and Bankauskaite, 2005, p. 15).
Switzerland: The cantons and municipalities were almost exclusively re-
sponsible for health services at the inception of Switzerland in 1848. An attempt
to introduce a universal system of health insurance was made in 1899 with the
tabling of a health and accident insurance law. The rst proposal was rejected by
referendum so the proposals were changed and resubmitted. Finally, the legisla-
tion was passed by a second referendum in 1911. The health insurance allowed
insurance funds to take advantage of federal subsidies (comp. Minder, Schoen-
holzer, and Amiet, 2000, p. 6).
United Kingdom: The National Health Service (NHS) came into operation
in 1948. This Act was important in creating the pattern of post-Second World
War health service provision in the UK. It established the principle of collective
responsibility for health services, which was available to the entire population,
independent of individual income, without costs at the point of use (comp. Robin-
son and Dixon, 1999, p. 5).
53